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WHAT IS AUTONOMOUS ADAPTION? RESOURCE SCARCITY AND SMALLHOLDER 
AGENCY IN THAILAND 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The concept of autonomous adaptation is widely used to describe spontaneous acts of 
reducing risks posed by resource scarcity and, increasingly, climate change. Critics, however, 
have claimed it is unproven, or simplifies the agency by which smallholders respond to risk. 
This paper presents empirical research in eight Karen villages in Thailand to identify how 
resource scarcity is linked to adaptive responses including livelihood diversification. The 
paper argues that autonomous adaptation is driven by how environmental change and 
scarcity present livelihood risks, rather than physical risks alone. Adaptation planning 
therefore should acknowledge different experiences of risk, and socio-economic barriers to 
adaptation. 
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WHAT IS AUTONOMOUS ADAPTION? RESOURCE SCARCITY AND SMALLHOLDER 
AGENCY IN THAILAND 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
‘Adaptation’ is now widely discussed within development planning as a means of reducing 
risks posed by resource scarcity, environmental change, and increasingly as the result of 
climate change (Adger et al., 2007; Adger et al., 2003; Dessai et al., 2007). A key aspect of 
this discussion is how far planned forms of adaptation can be supplemented by 
‘autonomous adaptation,’ which are actions undertaken by affected people without planned 
interventions (IPCC, 2007; Smit et al., 2001, p877). 
 
Autonomous adaptation, however, is controversial. Debates within economics have argued 
that autonomous adaptation, by definition, is inefficient, and might reduce attention to 
necessary planned interventions (Chambwera & Stage, 2010, p. 9; Eisenack, 2009; Stern, 
2007). Analysts have therefore called for more evidence to identify how autonomous 
adaptation might occur, and connect with planned adaptation (IPCC, 2012, p. 399). 
 
Researchers on environmental adaptation within developing countries, on the other hand, 
have argued that there is a long history of how poorer societies have responded to resource 
scarcity and population growth (Boserup, 1965; Head, 2010; Netting, 1993; Tiffen et al., 
1994). These debates have also indicated that the term ‘autonomous’ might be a misnomer 
because adaptation can reflect pre-existing social practices; the capacity for local adaptation 
can be planned; and because adaptation might not occur spontaneously in the face of new 
 3 
environmental changes, but according to how changes impact on local needs and livelihood 
strategies (Ayers, 2011; Batterbury, 2011; Ribot, 2010; Rigg, 2006). 
 
Accordingly, various analysts have argued that adaptation among vulnerable populations 
‘should be done with a deeper awareness of the social, economic, cultural, and political 
factors that frame their actions, incentives, opportunities, and limitations for action’ 
(Christoplos et al., 2009, p. 3), and that ‘adaptation always has, and arguably should, refer to 
more than just responses to climate change’ (Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2008, p. 53). Indeed, 
one of the earliest papers describing a new ‘adaptation science’ proposed that development 
planning should assume not predefine the nature of risk and adaptive responses arising from 
environmental changes or scarcity, but instead ask ‘what’ is being adapted to (i.e. the 
experience of risk); ‘who’ adapts (what are the socio-economic barriers to adaptation); and 
‘how’ (how do these actions, adopted by certain groups, reduce vulnerability to 
environmental change) (Smit et al., 1999). 
 
This paper contributes to debates about autonomous adaptation in three ways. First, it 
reviews the tensions within academic and policy debates about the meaning and ways of 
achieving autonomous adaptation. This discussion especially refers to the differences 
between interpretations of adaptation under climate change policy, and from pre-existing 
debates about adaptation to resource scarcity and challenged livelihoods in developing 
countries. 
 
Second, it presents an empirical study of autonomous adaptation within an ethnic group in 
Thailand that has been associated with environmental adaptations in the past (the Karen). 
This study analyzes the differential experience of resource scarcity in eight villages in order 
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to assess how and for whom adaptive responses are adopted, including livelihood 
diversification. 
 
Third, the paper then draws lessons from this discussion and study for wider debates about 
the role of autonomous adaptation in development planning. The paper’s key argument is 
that autonomous adaptation can form an important complement to planned adaptation, but 
that autonomous adaptation, by definition, is driven by how environmental scarcity and 
change impact on the availability of livelihoods. Consequently, planned forms of adaptation 
need to acknowledge the relationships between environmental change and livelihood risk, 
and how socio-economic barriers limit both livelihoods and adaptive responses. Building 
adaptation policy on the nature of physical risks alone might fail to acknowledge these 
linkages to livelihoods, and could even restrict smallholder agency to undertake autonomous 
adaptation if the actions of planned adaptation inhibit livelihood diversification. 
 
2. RESOURCE SCARCITY AND AUTONOMOUS ADAPTATION 
 
Adaptation has been defined as adjustments to behavior or economic structures that reduce 
vulnerability of society in the face of scarcity or threatening environmental change (Adger et 
al., 2007). The term has been used in debates about resource scarcity for some years 
(Batterbury and Forsyth, 1999; Netting, 1993; Tiffen et al, 1994), but is increasingly used in 
the context of anthropogenic climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC, 2007: sections 5.5.1-2), distinguishes between ‘planned adaptation,’ which 
results from deliberate interventions, and ‘autonomous (or spontaneous) adaptation,’ which 
is ‘adaptation that does not constitute a conscious response to climatic stimuli but is 
triggered by ecological changes in natural systems and by market or welfare changes 
in human systems.’1 According to this definition, autonomous adaptation might include 
 5 
practices such as altering agricultural inputs, introducing water-managing technologies, 
altering cropping cycles, or diversifying economic activities. They can be based on pre-
existing ‘risk-management or production-enhancement activities,’ but which ‘have 
substantial potential to offset negative climate change impacts and take advantage of 
positive ones.’ 
 
The concept of autonomous adaptation, however, has raised various questions, sometimes 
because different disciplines understand adaptation in varying ways. Behavioral economists, 
for example, have interpreted adaptation as the alterations in individual behavior necessary 
to combat climate change. These economists have argued that adaptation will not happen 
autonomously (or without government action) because of the lack of market incentives to 
make private actors change behavior since climate protection remains a public good (where 
there are no rights to exclude actors who do not undertake changes) (Stern, 2007; Vernon, 
2008; World Bank, 2010). Accordingly, some economists have argued that ‘little adaptation 
is observed empirically’ and that ‘autonomous adaptation is inefficient’ (Eisenack, 2009, p. 
1). This interpretation of ‘adaptation’ as changing behavior was also used by Ostrom (2009, 
p. 8), who wrote ‘coping with climate change’ implies ‘the potential for building a more 
effective way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions at multiple levels.’  
 
For many other analysts of climate change policy, however, these discussions of adaptation 
above actually refer to climate change mitigation—or the reduction of greenhouse gas 
concentrations—rather than the more common definition of adaptation as actions that 
reduce the impacts of enhanced greenhouse gas concentrations (Adger et al., 2003; Hardee 
& Mutunga, 2009). But there is disagreement about how to understand these impacts. 
Burton (2009, p.89), for example, argues that most discussion of adaptation under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has utilized the so-
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called ‘pollutionist’ approach (Burton, 2009 p.89), which seeks to reduce direct harmful 
impacts of additional greenhouse gas concentrations such as floods and droughts. In 
contrast, the ‘development’ approach to adaptation seeks ‘to incorporate adaptation to 
climate in development planning and implementation’ including actions such as livelihood 
diversification, enhancing social safety nets, or integrating adaptation to climate change 
with disaster risk reduction. This approach draws on older research within cultural and 
political ecology on adaptation to resource scarcity, which have often distinguished between 
adaptive processes (the long-term changes faced by societies such as sedentarization or 
population growth), and adaptive strategies (the shorter-term means by which risk is 
reduced, such as terracing land or diversifying livelihoods). 
 
Accordingly, various analysts have argued that adaptive responses at the local level are not 
simply driven by environmental changes per se, but in how these changes present hazards 
for vulnerable people’s livelihoods and assets. And similarly, livelihood diversification in 
itself can be another form of adaptation if it means that people are less reliant on resources 
that are threatened by environmental changes (Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2008). Research on 
Sustainable Livelihood Approaches (SLAs), for example, has highlighted ways of diversifying 
sources of income in order to reduce the risks posed by specific environmental threats such 
as drought or declining soil fertility through actions such as livelihood diversification, 
agricultural intensification, and strategies of migration for income (although, as discussed 
below, the benefits of these strategies can be distributed unequally; and they are not a 
panacea against all environmental risks). 
 
But these points also pose questions for the concept of autonomous adaptation. If 
adaptation is seen as a wider process of seeking livelihoods in the face of resource scarcity, 
adaptation is not just an ‘autonomous’ response to new physical risks such as floods, but can 
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be based on pre-existing cultural and economic practices. In turn, the capacity to diversify 
livelihoods might also be built through processes of planned adaptation. But if planned 
adaptation only focuses on direct physical risks such as flooding, without assessing how 
these risks impact upon livelihoods, then development interventions might overlook local 
causes of social vulnerability to environmental changes, or options for making 
environmental changes less threatening to livelihoods.. Consequently, there is a need for 
debates about autonomous adaptation within climate change policy to consider lessons 
from older debates about adaptation to resource scarcity in order to understand how 
environmental changes might impact upon livelihoods, and how affected people respond. 
 
3. AUTONOMOUS ADAPTATION AND SMALLHOLDER AGENCY 
 
The term autonomous adaptation implies that individuals or communities can undertake 
adaptation to environmental risks and scarcity independently of outside intervention. But 
the agency of smallholders to undertake autonomous adaptation is uncertain and not 
always apparent. It is commonly claimed that the poorest people are most vulnerable to 
climate change (Smit et al., 2001), or that they can adapt to global climate change ‘with 
great difficulty and much pain’ (Kates, 2000, p. 15). But some analysts have argued there is 
an apparent paradox that relatively poor groups such as pastoralists in the West African 
Sahel or smallholder agriculturalists in Bangladesh have demonstrated great resilience to 
environmental change (Adger et al., 2003, p. 181). One report stated, ‘the poor adapt in 
diverse ways that are usually unnoticed, uncoordinated, and unaided by national 
governments, development agencies, or international agencies. This autonomous 
adaptation is often overlooked in international and national efforts to manage the impacts 
of climate change,’ (Christoplos et al., 2009, p. 3). 
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But how does autonomous adaptation occur? Early analysis of so-called adaptation science 
identified three questions: ‘what’ is the risk; ‘who’ adapts; and ‘how’? (Smit et al., 1999). As 
discussed above, defining ‘what’ risk is crucial, as autonomous adaptation is not always to 
environmental or climate change alone, but to what these changes mean for livelihoods. 
Projected physical changes to climate or in the quality of resources such as forests and soil 
do not have an equal and predictable impact on all land users. The agency of smallholders 
for autonomous adaptations is more likely to reflect a combination of how environmental 
changes impact upon livelihood options, and how far socio-economic variables enhance or 
limit those options. Some analysts have argued that autonomy, therefore, is an example of a 
Senian capabilities approach that seeks to identify useful outcomes in terms of what 
vulnerable people value themselves, rather than defining progress in terms of predefined 
ideas about scarcity (Alkire & Ibrahim, 2007).  
 
In addition, other debates about smallholder agency have also highlighted the need to 
identify how individuals and communities can control decisions autonomously of the state 
and wider market forces (Schneider & Niederle, 2010). In the context of autonomous 
adaptation to environmental risk, smallholder agency can include a combination of acts 
relating to the physical impacts of change (such as new property rights to share land and 
water, or strengthening infrastructure); or acts of livelihood diversification that reduce the 
impact of risks upon household income. 
 
But transitions to new livelihoods need to be assessed critically. First, livelihood 
diversification by itself, however, is not a panacea against all projected environmental risks 
and scarcity (Adger et al., 2009). Moreover, diversification can also be driven by ‘distressed’ 
rather than ‘progressive’ reasons if environmental scarcity reduces livelihoods options and 
smallholders are forced to develop alternatives (as discussed in northern Laos by Bouahom 
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et al, 2004). Second, livelihood diversification can bring risks of its own. One possibility is 
replacing so-called ‘type 1’ poverty (based on remoteness and limited smallholder 
agriculture) with ‘type 2’ poverty (low wages and exploitation in markets) (Rigg, 2006). But 
also, different communities, households or individuals might benefit unequally from 
adaptive strategies and new livelihoods, which can sometimes reflect pre-existing wealth 
and gender relations (Carr, 2008; Nielsen & Reenberg, 2010; Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2008, 
p.56). Moreover, diversification is usually not a simple transition from one livelihood to 
another, but a growing reliance on ‘pluriactivity’ (or diverse activities at different times and 
places by individuals or household members), which can leave some households or 
household members dependent on traditional livelihoods (Ellis, 2000b). Livelihood 
diversification is also constrained by state economic policies and social structures, including 
the possible intentions and effects of planned adaptation activities (Bryceson, 1999, 2002). 
 
This paper now presents a study of autonomous adaptation within an ethnic group in 
Thailand that has a long reputation for engaging in community-based natural resource 
management and adaptations to resource scarcity. The study asks ‘what’ environmental or 
livelihood risk is being adapted to; ‘who adapts;’ and ‘how’? The objective is to identify the 
driving forces for autonomous adaptation, and to draw lessons for its use in contemporary 
environmental policy. 
 
 
4. RESOURCE SCARCITY AND ADAPTATION IN NORTHERN THAILAND 
 
Northern Thailand is an appropriate region to study the relationship of resource scarcity and 
autonomous adaptation because it has been the source of analysis of environmental 
degradation and the agency of smallholders for years (Kunstadter et al, 1978). The region 
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itself is a mountainous (typically of altitude 500—2000 meters above sea level) with a large 
upland population of smallholder agriculturalists. Various analysts have predicted ecological 
collapse in this region because of the alleged impacts of traditional shifting cultivation and 
population growth on steep slopes and dwindling forests (Ives et al, 1980). But there has 
also been widespread research about the diverse ways that local ethnic minorities manage 
shifting cultivation and environmental scarcity (Cooper, 1984; Judd, 1964; Forsyth & Walker, 
2008; Fox et al, 2000). Writing about food shortages in the region in 1972-74, two 
anthropologists from the USA predicted noted: ‘the swidden fields, used with minimum, if 
any, fallow periods, gave reduced harvests. Some villages lay amid a sterility that 
approached the stone-dead streets of cities, with uplanders like vagrants, unable to sustain 
themselves’ (Hanks & Hanks, 2001, p. 238). Yet, despite various environmental changes and 
problems, this region-wide collapse did not occur. The explanation seems to include a 
variety of planned and autonomous adaptation. 
 
Concerning planned adaptations, the Thai government has intervened to create zones of 
protected land: since Thailand’s National Park Act of 1964, more than 100 national parks 
have been declared, with over 20 located in the nine northern provinces where they take up 
over 15 percent of the total land area, and the proportion of the four northernmost 
provinces now classified under Class 1 watershed protection (the area with the most 
stringent land use controls) has been estimated at 30 percent (Forsyth & Walker, 2008, p. 
26), where the Thai government has stated ‘immediate reforestation programs must be 
undertaken on the abundant shifting [cultivation] area’ (Royal Forest Department, 2004).2 In 
addition, government and international aid agencies have introduced technologies such as 
grass strips and nitrogen-fixing crops in order to maintain upland soil fertility (Van Keer et 
al., 1998), and introduced export crops such as cabbages and strawberries to diversify 
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livelihoods and replace traditional opium production (Renard, 2001). Non-agricultural and 
waged income has also been encouraged. 
 
Autonomous adaptation has apparently lain in the willingness of farmers to adopt new 
livelihoods such as more diverse crops, and employment on farms, or in cities and 
occasionally via temporary waged work in Taiwan and Japan (Walker, 2009). Irrigated rice 
terraces are more common on valley bottoms, which enhance food production and the 
potential for export crops. These transitions also occur against cultural traditions of different 
ethnic groups. Much anthropological research on environmental management in Thailand 
divided upland smallholders into so-called ‘pioneer’ shifting cultivators (such as the Hmong 
and Mien)—who used land exhaustively for 10-20 years before relocating villages—and 
‘rotational’ cultivators (such as the Karen)—who used land rotationally around semi-
permanent villages (Delang, 2003; Grandstaff, 1980). The Karen in particular were noted for 
their rai mun wian swidden system using seven-year fallow periods, and for practices such as 
protecting tree stumps and forest land to enhance forest regrowth (Chaleo Kanjunt, 2007; 
Payong Srithong, 2007; Pinkaew Laungaramsri, 2001; Rambo, 2007; Schmidt-Vogt, 1998). 
Indeed Karen agriculture has been claimed to be an appropriate response to climate change 
(Northern Development Foundation, 2011). 
 
But at the same time, some analysts have also argued that these explanations of adaptation 
are based in part on a misplaced explanation of environmental risk in the first place. 
Research in Thailand since the 1990s has indicated that upland agriculture might not be as 
environmentally degrading as thought in the 1970s (similar to debates about Nepal: Metz, 
1991; Blaikie & Muldavin, 2004). For example, studies have shown that upland farmers 
undertake various means of reducing risk from soil erosion by reducing cultivation on steep 
slopes; matching cropping cycles with periods of more or less rainfall in order to minimize 
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the exposure of bare soil; and using organic and inorganic fertilizers for food production.3 
Moreover, the relationship of upland and lowland degradation has been rethought by 
research showing that erosion and runoff are also caused by geological gullying (also 
occurring under forests) and roads,4 and that the impacts of upland agriculture on lowland 
water shortages is overstated, in part because not all agricultural slopes lead directly to 
watercourses (Forsyth, 1996; Turkelboom, 1999, p. 169).5 Consequently, ‘adaptation’ has 
apparently succeeded in northern Thailand partly because analysts overstated the nature 
and causes of environmental risks in the past. 
 
Similarly, the agency of smallholders in autonomous adaptation has also been questioned. 
Much discussion about adaptation has suggested that ethnic minorities in villages perceive 
and respond to environmental risks and scarcities proactively (Pinkaew Laungaramsri, 2001; 
Northern Development Foundation, 2011). Later research, however, suggests that the 
debate about smallholder agency overlooks how village populations are increasingly 
transient or ‘owe little allegiance to the land and who have become dependent on work 
ultimately shaped by forces that lie beyond the area’ (Rigg et al., 2010, p. 148).6 Another 
concern is that upland agriculture is now substantially commercialized and therefore it is 
difficult to identify ‘Karen’ agriculture from mainstream agriculture (Suppakorn Chinvanno, 
2011). Some critics have also proposed that government and non-governmental 
organizations have deliberately portrayed the Karen as an especially conservationist ethnic 
group in order to influence political debates about community forestry (Hayami, 1993; 
Walker, 2001). One proposed bill for community forestry in the early 2000s proposed that 
‘communities’ are a ‘group of people that live together as a society in the same area and 
pass down their culture together,’ and display a ‘culture of coexistence that favors forest 
protection’ (Anonymous, no date). Statements like these, however, define environmental 
risks as forest loss, and adaptive responses as forest-friendly communities, at a time when 
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more and more farmers are seeking livelihoods outside of traditional agriculture, and old 
notions of community are decreasing. 
 
Consequently, there is widespread evidence that upland smallholders exercise considerable 
agency in adapting to resource scarcity in northern Thailand. But historic debates have 
tended to represent this process in terms of traditional communities perceiving and 
responding to changes in landscape that are considered problematic by outsiders, rather 
than acknowledging the importance of resource scarcity to livelihood strategies and the 
dynamic nature of household decisionmaking. Instead, there is a need to rethink—in the 
words of Smit et al. (1999)—‘what’ is being adapted to, by ‘whom,’ in order to understand 
‘how’ autonomous adaptation occurs, both in Thailand and in general. The following study 
was therefore undertaken to understand what drives autonomous adaptation among an 
ethnic group experiencing resource scarcity, and with a reputation for adaptive responses in 
the past. 
 
 
5. THE STUDY 
 
The study was based among Karen7 villages in Mae Hong Son province of northern Thailand. 
As noted above, the Karen in Thailand are popularly associated with environmental 
adaptation. Mae Hong Son is the most northwestern province in Thailand, characterized by 
steep slopes and valleys on the Burmese border that ‘frequently endures water related 
disasters such as flash floods, urban inundations, and slope failures that have caused severe 
impacts on people’s live property and the natural environment’ (Anond Snidvongs, 2009). It 
is one of the poorest provinces in Thailand. 
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Eight villages were selected in order to investigate experiences of environmental risk and 
autonomous adaptation. The sample of eight was considered sufficient to reach some level 
of generalization in the time allowed, and to provide sufficient variety for statistical analysis. 
Villages were selected in order to represent relatively ‘large’ and ‘small’ settlements that 
were either near or far from market towns. A local NGO’s8 database was used to classify all 
Karen villages on that side according to size and distance from local market towns (district 
capitals, or amphoe). Villages were then selected randomly from categories above or below 
the median number of households per village (41), and the median distance to the district 
capital (35 kilometers) (see Table 1). Villages were only selected from the eastern side of 
province in order to minimize the influence of the Burmese border on matters such as 
refugees and military presence. 
 
The resulting eight villages varied between 30 and 80 households; distances of between 5-45 
kilometers from markets; and altitudes between 376-1236 meters above sea level. The 
oldest village (Hua Mae Surin) was claimed by the village head to be 360 years old; the 
newest (Doi Lam and Huay Rin) were established in the 1940s. One village (Mae La Pa Wai) 
was relocated to its current site in 1990 following shortage of water, but was established 
more than a century ago (see Table 2). Villages were not anonymized on the advice of other 
researchers and village representatives because research did not focus on illegal activities. 
Individual informants were anonymized. 
 
[TABLE 1 (CLASSIFICATION OF VILLAGES SELECTED) HERE] 
[TABLE 2 (CHARACTERISTICS OF VILLAGES) HERE] 
 
The study used qualitative interviews and observation, and quantitative household surveys 
to identify the experience of resource scarcity and adaptive responses. Forty-nine key 
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informants (comprising village elders and heads, both men and women) were consulted 
through semi-structured interviews, and 138 household surveys based on questionnaires 
were completed (aiming for 40 percent of households in each village), resulting in 
information about 734 people, including 589 living in villages and 145 away from villages. 
One of the authors located herself in the villages for three months, assisted by a male Karen 
interpreter9 and by shorter fieldwork by the other author. Work was conducted mainly 
through the interpreter in Karen language, but also in fluent Thai language by both authors. 
 
Villagers were asked to talk about environmental problems and resource scarcity in open-
ended terms in order to emphasize local experiences of risk and scarcity. This information 
was supplemented by quantified measurements of resource scarcity at the household 
level.10 These measurements included the availability of irrigated terraced land (na), versus 
non-irrigated sloping land (rai) (which is usually less productive, and prone to erosion); as 
well as the length of fallow for rai. Na is usually more productive for food crops than rai 
because it is irrigated and flat, whereas rai is usually less productive because it is prone to 
erosion, and requires labor- and time-intensive weeding after some years’ use. An index of 
access to na at the village level was calculated by dividing the total kilograms of rice 
produced on rai by the total kilograms of rice produced on na. Villages with high levels of na 
therefore had higher scores under this index. This index was useful because it gave a fast 
indication of the availability of irrigated, productive land, compared with weed-infested, 
erodible land on hillsides. (Kilograms were chosen because this was the unit most easily 
discussed by villagers rather than spatial area). Some smaller villagers also described a third 
category of suan, or garden, which referred to small vegetable plots next to houses. 
 
Information about possible adaptive responses was collected by asking villagers about how 
they responded to scarcity of agricultural land, or other forms of environmental risk such as 
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floods or landslides. This information also included practices of livelihood diversification or 
sources of income outside of the village. Market opportunities and livelihood diversification 
were measured through the existence of non-agricultural income and the numbers of 
household members who worked employed in various activities. (In turn, these factors were 
expected to be related to access to na because na is more productive than rai, which in turn 
might influence availability of labor to apply to non-agricultural activities).  
 
Socio-economic differences between households and individuals were assessed using a 
system of asset ranking (Clarke, 2006). Households were given scores depending on the 
material the home was made from; if the household had an electricity supply; how food was 
cooked (electricity or gas or locally-collected fuelwood); and ownership of high value items 
such as motorcycles and pick-up trucks. Three categories were created to indicate ‘high,’ 
‘medium,’ and ‘low’ asset ranks.11 This information was also cross-referenced to age and 
gender or respondents; village size and distance from markets; and any deliberate choices to 
make institutions governing land use or market access. 
 
The indices and other quantitative information were tested for statistical associations using 
chi-square tests (because much information relied on categories rather than absolute 
numbers).12 This style of analysis was supplemented by more qualitative statements from 
villagers and other research about longer-term trends. The following analysis combines 
information about villages in aggregate, and then a more detailed breakdown of which kinds 
of households might experience risk and adaptive responses. 
 
Information is presented firstly concerning the nature of scarcity and environmental risk; 
and then the motivations, or agency, for autonomous adaptation. 
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(a) Resource scarcity and environmental risk: adaptation to what? 
 
The research revealed that the most persistently discussed aspect of resource scarcity and 
ecological change in all villages was the shortage of productive, irrigated na terraces, and 
the declining agricultural productivity on non-irrigated, sloping rai land. These factors were 
discussed in all villages, and informants explained that they presented livelihood risks to 
smallholders because they placed limitations on the ability to produce food and tradable 
crops; and increased the labor needed to prepare rai land for cultivation.  
 
The most common explanations from villagers for these shortages were: the growth of 
populations (and the practice of dividing land between sons); the decline of soil fertility, 
especially on the sloping rai land; and government restrictions on land use, such as planting 
pine and teak plantations on land that previously had been used for agriculture on both 
slopes and valley bottoms.13 These factors were described to be taking place in all villages 
surveyed. 
 
Various villagers also referred to high-magnitude storms and floods, which—so far—had 
apparently occurred in Mae Hong Son province every two or so years, and had caused small 
numbers of fatalities in 2009 and 2011. These events were considered problematic, 
however, because they damaged irrigated terraces (and their crops), and deposited 
sediment and boulders on agricultural land, which required time, labor, and tractors to 
remove. 
 
The experience of environmental risks and resource scarcity, therefore, were almost 
exclusively defined in terms of what these processes meant for agricultural productivity and 
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the availability of livelihoods. But resource scarcity was not simply defined by the physical 
size of available agricultural land, but by the combination of labor, time, and likely profit 
from cultivating different land. The ratio between na (terraces) and rai (non-irrigated land) 
was an important indicator of land scarcity because villagers with more na could achieve 
more reliable agricultural production during both dry and wet seasons (typically, growing 
rice in the wet summer, and garlic in the dry winter). In the relatively remote villagers 
(especially Hua Mae Surin and Mae Go Pii), villagers described that there seemed little 
opportunity to build rice terraces because land was restricted, in part because of forest 
plantations that were claimed by the government to protect the watershed and soil quality. 
 
But villagers or households with high levels of dependency on rai land were more vulnerable 
to declining soil fertility, and the need for more labor to prepare this land for cultivation 
because of weed infestations. Farmers who could use both na and rai could afford to 
cultivate short-term cash crops on rai without investing time or labor into preparing land. 
Those with only rai had to invest more time into preparing land because this was their only 
agricultural land—unless they could adopt non-agricultural incomes. Together, these factors 
contributed to the relative absence of the most traditional forms of Karen agriculture in the 
eight villages. An average of 10 percent of households questioned still practiced rai mun 
wian (traditional rotational cultivation) (ranging from zero to some 25 percent). As 
predicted, rai mun wian was more prevalent in villages with low access to na. 
 
Table 3 shows some statistical differences between the eight villages. The index of access to 
na (the relative supply of na compared to rai per village) varied between 100 and 21 percent 
(where 100 percent indicates that the amount of na equaled the amount of rai). Access to 
na was greater on average in valleys closer to market towns (especially Pattana Puku and 
Huay Rin). This finding was unsurprising as the proximity of markets was often an incentive 
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to convert land to terraces in order to sell crops; and because market towns tended to be in 
relative lowlands where land is easier to convert into terraces. 
 
But there were also some unexpected findings. The most remote village (Huay Mak Lang, at 
an average altitude of 1000m) relied on na for nearly 90 percent of rice production—
apparently because of government restrictions on using non-irrigated land for agriculture.  
 
Furthermore, villages with limited access to na tended not to use rai land for growing rice to 
eat, but instead to cultivate traded commercial crops (such as garlic and cabbage). These 
people instead bought rice at markets. Consequently, villagers with relatively few irrigated 
terraces were more dependent on selling crops at markets than those with more irrigated 
terraces. In Huay Mak Lang, farmers said that the shortage of land encouraged them to grow 
soybeans because growing rice on rai was unattractive and unprofitable because rai 
required so much weeding.  
 
But statistics also revealed that 75 percent of the poorest individuals (those in the lowest 
asset rank) were smallholders with no individual or household access to na. These farmers 
tended to make a living from various activities comprising agriculture, trade of non-
agriculture goods, working on other farms, or through some remittances from family 
members outside the village. Unsurprisingly, wealthier households in all villages had more 
access to na, and consequently used this land to grow rice. 
 
Accordingly, the experience of environmental problems in the villages was not related 
simply to the existence of high-magnitude physical hazards such as storms and floods, but to 
scarcity of productive resources, or degradation of land in ways that required more 
investment of labor. These challenges were experienced more strongly when villages were 
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distant from local markets, or where government policies reforested land, or restricted 
agricultural expansion. The experience of vulnerability as relating to resource scarcity was 
therefore diverse and influenced by various socio-economic and political factors, rather than 
physical risks alone. The next section discusses more about the different ways these risks 
were distributed between households in order to answer ‘how’ adaptive practices occur, 
and by ‘whom.’  
 
 
(b) Autonomous adaptation: Who adapts and how? 
 
This section summarizes evidence for the agency for autonomous adaptation—or how (and 
which) smallholders respond to resource scarcity. 
 
Discussions with villagers showed that the most common forms of autonomous adaptation 
to scarcity included changes in property rights on land; technological changes such as 
increasing the use of irrigated terraces and fertilizers; diversifying crops grown and traded; 
and diversifying livelihoods beyond agriculture. These steps reflect research on livelihood 
diversification and agricultural intensification elsewhere (Ellis, 1998, 2000a). 
 
(i) Property rights and agricultural intensification 
 
Changing property rights on productive land was an apparently growing form of 
autonomous adaptation. There was a marked difference in the nature of individual property 
rights and claims on land between villages more or less dependent on na. When land was 
short in supply, villagers would be readier to claim land was their own (including fallow 
land), rather than available to the entire village. (This transition has also been noted among 
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the Iu Mien ethnic group in Chiang Rai province during the 1970s; Forsyth, 1996). Very little 
land in general was rented out to, or borrowed from, other users. For example, nearly 80 
percent of na and nearly 90 percent of rai used for rice production in all villages was used 
exclusively by owners (although nearly 30 percent of na in all villages was shared between 
siblings). Villagers explained that this situation differed from some five or more years before 
when there was more flexible access to rai land in particular.  
 
In addition, individuals in villages with lower access to na were particularly vocal in stating 
claims to land in fallow (i.e. not currently cultivated) and claimed larger absolute areas of 
fallow. This result is not surprising, as upland soil fertility depends on maintaining fallow 
periods. But this result also apparently contradicts the earlier belief that greater competition 
for land would decrease fallow periods, and instead suggests that social institutions have 
now developed to protect the length of time for fallow periods. On average, farmers using 
rai mun wian still claimed to have fallow of up to six years. But in villages with higher access 
to na, fallow periods were decreasing at a faster rate. In these locations, more than one 
individual said they did not use fallow because ‘anyone can use anyplace.’ Consequently, 
fallow has broken down where there are alternative forms of agriculture and livelihoods; but 
farmers still protect fallow when there are no alternatives. 
 
Building terraced land and using agrochemicals were also physical forms of adaptation. 
Where farmers could build terraced land, they did so. At the time of research, however, 
most available land had already been converted, and potential additional land usually 
involved conflict with the Royal Forest Department concerning ownership, with the 
expectation that land might be reforested. Agrochemicals were widely used as a way to 
increase production of commercial crops such as soybean and garlic on na and suan 
(especially in the larger villagers of Pattana Puku and Huay Rin). Most farmers interviewed 
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considered chemicals as a usual part of agricultural practice, and used their own funds to 
purchase them. But, local government officials also provided small amounts of pesticide 
free-of-charge to farmers who cultivated rai (thus blurring the lines between autonomous 
and government-sponsored adaptation). Fertilizer (as opposed to pesticide and herbicide) 
was also used in Huay Mak Long because its remoteness and high altitude made specific 
problems of productivity. Unsurprisingly, the richest households used most agrochemicals in 
remoter villages, but in villages close to markets all households used chemicals in equal 
amounts. 
 
(ii) Livelihood diversification  
 
Adaptive responses also included working away from villages, and adopting new activities. 
Most people ‘away’ from home were aged between 10-30. Younger teenagers generally 
attended school, whereas adults undertook diverse activities, including one accountant in a 
city-based company; workers in a spectacles factory; cleaners, and janitors. Nearly 30 
percent of people reported to be ‘away’ worked in Bangkok; followed by 13 percent in the 
regional capital of Chiang Mai. (All of these statistics are based on a sample of 40 percent of 
households in the eight villages). There were also non-agricultural activities for people living 
in villages such as teachers and drivers. Tourism (such as selling souvenirs or accommodating 
trekkers) is not a major factor in this part of northern Thailand.  Table 3 shows that the 
proportion of people semi-permanently employed in non-agricultural positions outside of 
villages ranged from 15 to 28 percent. (The research did not interview Karen people who 
had already migrated to locations outside the villages, and hence these statistics do not 
classify migrants into categories such as how much time away, or longer-term intentions) 
Rigg et al, 2010). 
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Agricultural labor on neighboring farms was also a market opportunity. Most villagers 
questioned worked on other Karen farms, usually unpaid as part of a reciprocal arrangement 
for sharing labor. Some also worked on neighboring farms owned or operated by Thai or 
Hmong farmers (a trend discussed by Cohen, 1984). Only four villages supplied labor to Thai 
farms, and two to Hmong farms, with proportions ranging from 20–60 percent of adults 
(Table 3). Unsurprisingly, more people from poorer households worked on Hmong or Thai 
farms than those from richer households, and were paid daily. 
 
[TABLE 3 (DETAILS OF VILLAGES) HERE] 
 
The research gave some indication for which people (or which kinds of villages) were able to 
engage in livelihood diversification. The highest proportions of people working ‘away’ from 
villages occurred where there was a relatively high access to na (irrigated terraces). Equally, 
the highest concentrations of workers on their own farms were in villages with low access to 
na. These results suggest three possible explanations. First, working on rai (non-terraced 
agricultural land) might demand more labor, and hence restrict other livelihood options. 
Second, rai offers less opportunity for making money that is required to enter many non-
agricultural occupations. The third possible explanation is that villages further away from 
markets also tended to have larger household sizes (an average of 5.7 compared to 4.9), and 
hence statistically a smaller proportion of these villages might be working ‘away.’ 
 
There was no simple relationship between the amounts of na and rai and distance to 
markets within the eight villages sampled. But it was clear that in some especially remote 
villages (such as Hua Mae Surin) steep slopes and topography made it hard to convert much 
land into irrigated terraces: these characteristics also made these villages susceptible to 
land-use restrictions and reforestation by the government. 
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There were no obvious trends between household size and access to na, and average 
wealth. But results suggested that villages with smaller levels of na had significantly more 
young people away aged 10-20 than villages with high access to na. Some of this trend was 
explained by schooling—where it is common for young Karen to stay in dormitories to 
attend district schools—although this is more common for children younger than 10. 
Instead, discussions with household representatives suggested that young people are likely 
to migrate to earn money when there is a low access to na because working on rai is either 
unattractive or financially unrewarding. This trend also suggests that the farmers who 
continue mun rai wian on non-irrigated slopes are older Karen rather than younger Karen 
who instead choose to work elsewhere.  
 
The implication of these findings is that there are different types of experience that lead to 
different adaptive responses. People in villages with relatively high levels of productive land 
(especially na) were more likely to migrate for work, or engage in livelihood activities 
outside of farm work. Moreover, these people were more likely to be younger. Meanwhile, 
people in villages with relatively small access to irrigated terraces tended to remain in these 
villages and worked to produce traded agriculture crops.  
 
There was no evidence linking age of migrants to wealth (asset ranks), but unsurprisingly, 
households from the richest asset group had the widest diversity of occupations, and a 
greater proportion of off-farm employment. The proportion of each asset rank ‘working 
‘away’ was 13 percent for the first (poorest), 19 percent for the middle rank, and 30 percent 
for the richest group. It was challenging to gain accurate information about remittances 
because many villagers were reticent to share information. Research suggested, however, 
that some 30 percent of people away from villages sent back remittances. 
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Some gendered trends in livelihood options were also apparent. Female-headed households 
were more prominent in poorer households (40 percent of the poorest asset rank, 20 
percent of the middle rank, and zero of the richest rank). Furthermore, in villages close to 
markets, or where villages have a small amount of na, more young men studied away from 
the village than women.14 When women worked on Thai farms, they came from villages with 
low access to na. Consequently, it would seem that men are more likely to benefit from 
opportunities outside villages. 
 
Consequently, market opportunities and barriers therefore also underlie adaptation 
strategies. Evidence suggests that access to irrigated, na terraces is more important in 
influencing the agency for livelihood diversification or agricultural strategies than simply 
proximity to markets.15 Livelihood diversification and mobility is less likely among smaller 
villages with reduced access to na, as well as older people and women in general. 
 
The agency for autonomous adaptation, therefore, is therefore complicated by diverse 
experiences of risk, plus various influences on how far different individuals, households, or 
villages might be able to undertake adaptive responses to these risks. Research scarcity and 
environmental change are mainly interpreted according to how far they affect different 
types of productive land. Different access to these types of land influence which parties can 
change livelihood decisions in order to diversify off-farm activities, or protect the 
productivity of existing land. Evidence so far from these eight villages suggests that 
livelihood diversification and new institutions to impose property rights on fallow land are 
indeed forms of autonomous adaptation that can reduce the risks posed by resource 
scarcity. But the experience of risks, and the access to responses are unequal. The most 
likely vulnerable social groups increasingly seem to be older people (especially women), in 
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villages with little access to irrigated productive land, where (so far) it is relatively difficult to 
gain access to alternative off-farm livelihoods. In general, older people (who were often 
defined as people whose children had farming practices and families of their own) lived with 
their children. But in some cases, these younger generations were away from the village, 
and therefore the older people lived alone (although these number comprised less than 20 
percent of older people interviewed). 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS: SMALLHOLDER AGENCY AND AUTONOMOUS ADAPTATION 
 
This paper has sought to contribute to debates about the concept of autonomous 
adaptation by looking critically at questions of agency within smallholders’ reactions to 
resource scarcity, and by presenting evidence from a study in Thailand. What are the lessons 
for understanding autonomous adaptation in development planning? 
 
First, it is clear that different analytical approaches to autonomous adaptation within 
academic and policy literatures are sometimes semantically different, and use varying 
implicit models of risk. The arguments of some economists that ‘little adaptation is observed 
empirically’ and that ‘autonomous adaptation is inefficient’ (Eisenack, 2009, p. 1) clearly 
understand ‘adaptation’ as conformance with regulations or specific policies, rather than 
responses that reduce local experiences of risk or scarcity. Yet, ‘autonomous’ adaptation, by 
definition, is a response that is driven by local experiences, and there are various studies 
from developing countries that provide evidence of behavior changes and strategies to 
reduce risks without official interventions (Adger et al., 2003; Batterbury & Forsyth, 1999; 
Netting, 1993; Tiffen et al, 1994). Accordingly, there needs to be more attention to older 
research on adaptation to environmental scarcity in developing countries as a guide to 
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current concerns about adaptation to climate change (Ayers, 2011; Christoplos, et al, 2009; 
Head, 2010). 
 
Second, and related to this initial point, autonomous adaptations should be defined as 
responses that maintain livelihoods in the face of environmental change and scarcity, rather 
than actions that control physical hazards without connection to livelihoods. Much planned 
adaptation under the UNFCCC typically aims to protect against physical risks such as storms 
and floods. Yet, autonomous responses to these events will reflect how these events impact 
on the lives and livelihoods of affected people rather than the events in themselves. In turn, 
these responses also reflect pre-existing structures of social vulnerability and methods of 
managing resource scarcity (Ribot, 2010; Marino & Ribot, 2012). 
 
There is accordingly a danger that planned adaptation might focus too much on physical 
changes alone—as though these are the risks themselves—rather than on what these 
changes mean for vulnerable people. As Christoplos et al (2009, p.3, p.33) noted, 
‘autonomous adaptation is often overlooked in international and national efforts… existing 
calls for “climate proofing” development should …ensure that development efforts “do no 
harm” with respect to processes of autonomous adaptation.’ The statement of the IPCC 
(2007) that autonomous adaptation is ‘adaptation that does not constitute a conscious 
response to climatic stimuli but is triggered by ecological changes in natural systems and by 
market or welfare changes in human systems’ apparently gives much emphasis to the role of 
environmental change in ‘triggering’ responses. Evidence suggests that autonomous 
adaptation is driven by more than ecological changes alone. 
 
Consequently, thirdly, a key part of understanding autonomous adaptation is to understand 
the agency and socio-economic barriers for vulnerable people to participate in responses 
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that reduce risk or scarcity. Development planning can aim to decrease barriers to 
autonomous adaptation such as by providing opportunities for livelihood diversification, or 
for local means of reducing the impacts of declining assets. Yet, it is also important to 
acknowledge that the experience of risks will vary between people with different levels of 
livelihood diversification and adaptive practices. Thus, again, planned forms of adaptation 
need to address various risks, rather than assume that projections of physical environmental 
changes are an adequate and universal summary of how different people are affected. 
 
These conclusions are demonstrated in the analysis presented from Thailand. The Karen 
ethnic group has been associated with adaptive practices for years, and live in a zone where 
declining soil fertility, land shortage, and floods present various hazards. Yet, government 
plans for environmental management have reflected assumptions about reforestation and 
community life that local villagers claim increases land shortage, and which generally do not 
correspond with new trends in how villagers seek livelihoods. Anthropogenic climate change 
is projected to bring more frequent and extreme floods in this region, and indeed floods 
have already caused fatalities (Anond Snidvongs, 2009; Yusuf & Francisco, 2010). Although 
these floods are hazardous, the driving forces for autonomous adaptations to date have 
been scarcity of livelihood options through quality agricultural land or off-farm livelihood 
diversification, rather than concern at the floods themselves. Karen villagers have shown 
various forms of autonomous adaptation, including livelihood diversification and developing 
new institutions to protect soil fertility. A key controlling factor here seems to be access to 
irrigated agricultural land and markets. 
 
Planned forms of adaptation need to acknowledge these diverse experiences of risk and 
work to increase access to adaptation—as well as address risks from high-magnitude events 
such as floods. Asking the three questions of ‘adaptation to what,’ ‘who adapts,’ and ‘how’ 
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(Smit et al, 1999) provides a means of understanding what role autonomous adaptation can 
play, and the agency of smallholders in achieving it. 
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1 http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/annexessglossary-a-d.html 
2 Much reforestation and resettlement was also linked to controlling security at a time when 
Thailand was concerned about Communist or other insurgencies.  
3 Some critics have claimed fertilizers might damage soil productivity, although the evidence 
for these claims is contested (Forsyth & Walker, 2008). 
4 McKinnon (1986: 22) estimated that 30 percent of erosion (and sedimentation) results from 
road construction. Turkelboom (1999: 169) noted that only 30 percent of agricultural slopes 
in a research site in Chiang Rai province led directly to watercourses, and consequently 
could not feed lowland sedimentation. 
5 Turkelboom estimates that some 30 percent of agricultural slopes are disconnected from 
watercourses in his research site in northern Chiang Rai province. It is also worth noting that 
the significant floods experienced in Thailand in 2011 were generally blamed on excessive 
rainfall and poor coordination between reservoirs, rather than on deforestation, indicating a 
possible further breaking up of old explanations of environmental risk (Walker, 2011). 
6 Rigg et al’s (2010) study was near Ayuthaya, central Thailand, a more ethnically uniform 
and commercialized location than most of northern Thailand. 
7 The Karen (or Kariang) in Thailand are often divided into four subgroups of the Skaw (the 
most numerous, also known as White Karen, which are called Sgaw in Myanmar); Pwo; Pa-o 
(or Black Karen); and Kayah (Karenni or Red Karen). This study focused on Skaw alone. 
(Source: Tribal Research Institute of Chiang Mai; Hinton, 1983). 
8 The Karen Hilltribes Trust http://www.karenhilltribes.org.uk/  
9 The interpreter was recommended by the NGO and was known to all villages. The presence 
of a female researcher and male interpreter hopefully enhanced access to both genders in 
the village. Advice was sought from local advisers about respecting gender codes and 
cultural norms within Karen villages. 
10 Intra-household allocations were not assessed quantitatively in this study. 
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11 As noted in other development research, wealth can also come and go unexpectedly. In 
this study, we found that death of a relative, divorce, or deterioration of health can cause 
sudden poverty. Sudden wealth could also arise from acquiring new land (typically through 
marriage), children moving away (decreasing costs at home, and raising possibilities for 
remittances); and good harvests. Another factor is village-level debt, often inspired by 
government schemes to help village development (but also linked to populist electoral 
strategies). 
12 A positive chi-square test was observed when distributions between categories were 
significantly different (to 90 percent confidence) from what might be expected in the 
absence of any trends. 
13 At the time of research there was no evidence of government plantations being placed on 
irrigated rice terraces, although some non-terraced valley bottoms had been reforested; 
presumably because terraced land was usually built on land with recognized certificates of 
ownership. 
14 Possibly this finding was caused by the unusual situation in Mae Yuam Luang, a village 
near to a market and with a low access to na, in which no women were ‘away.’ 
15 Indeed, the village with most people in the poorest asset rank, Mae Yuam Luang has just 
57 percent access to na, but is located very close to Pattana Puku with the richest 
households, with 100 percent access.  
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 1 
 
 
Population Size 
Small    Large 
     (<41 households)                       (>41 households) 
 
Vil lage names: 
 
Hua Mae Surin  
 
 
Mae La Pa Wai  
 
 
 
Huay Mak Lang  
 
 
Mae Go Pii  
 
 
Mae Yuam Luang  
 
 
Doi Liam 
 
 
Pattana Puku 
 
 
Huay Rin 
 
  
TABLE 1. CLASSIFICATION OF VILLAGES SELECTED  
(Source: the authors) 
  
Distance from 
Market 
 
High 
(>35 km) 
 
 
 
 
Low 
(<35 km)    
 2 
 
 
TABLE 2. KAREN VILLAGES STUDIED IN MAE HONG SON 
PROVINCE 
(Location and elevation confirmed by hand-held GPS; estimated households for 2010) 
 
 
Village Tambol 
(subdistrict) 
Amphoe 
(district) 
Changwat 
(region) 
Latitude and 
Longitude 
Elevation 
/m asl 
Total 
households 
Pattana 
Puku 
Mae Oo Kor Khun 
Yuam 
Mae Hong 
Son 
N 18o50.582 
E 097o59.867 
659 50 
Mae Yuam 
Luang 
Mae Oo Kor Khun 
Yuam 
Mae Hong 
Son 
N 18o49.638 
E 098o02.331 
859 20 
Hua Mae 
Surin 
Mae Oo Kor Khun 
Yuam 
Mae Hong 
Son 
N 18o55.237 
E 098o05.105 
1236 30 
Huay Mak 
Lang 
Huay Pong Mae 
Hong Son 
Mae Hong 
Son 
N 18o58.042 
E 098o06.158 
1203 50 
Mae La Pa 
Wai 
Kun Mae La    Mae La 
Noi  
Mae Hong 
Son 
N 18o34.886 
E 098o09.001 
752 30 
Mae Go Pii  Mae Yuam 
Noi   
Khun 
Yuam   
Mae Hong 
Son 
N 18o42.242 
E 098o04.009 
770 80 
Doi Liam Mae Hor     Mae 
Sariang 
Mae Hong 
Son 
N 18o06.945 
E 098o06.309 
883 40 
Huay Rin  Mae Noi     Mae La 
Noi  
Mae Hong 
Son 
N 18o22.599 
E 097o58.251 
376 55 
 
  
 3 
TABLE 3: SAMPLE INDICATORS OF LIVELIHOOD DIVERSITY 
Source: fieldwork 2008, 2010, based on survey of 40 percent of households per vil lage 
 
 Hua 
Mae 
Surin 
Mae 
La Pa 
Wai 
Huay 
Mak 
Lang 
Mae 
Go Pii 
Mae 
Yuam 
Luang 
Doi 
Liam 
Pattana 
Puku 
Huay 
Rin 
 
Vil lage type 
Small, 
remote 
Small, 
remote 
Large, 
remote 
Large, 
remote 
Small, 
close to 
market 
Small, 
close to 
market 
Large, 
close   to 
market 
Large, 
close to 
market 
 
Access to na 
(%) (1) 
 
22 
 
72 
 
89 
 
21 
 
57 
 
75 
 
100 
 
87 
 
Rice bought 
at markets 
(%) (2) 
 
27 
 
0 
 
5 
 
3 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
17 
 
No. of crops 
grown (3) 
 
11 
 
14 
 
22 
 
16 
 
8 
 
14 
 
21 
 
17 
 
Average  total 
household 
size (4) 
 
 
4.6 
 
 
6.6 
 
 
6.0 
 
 
5.6 
 
 
5.1 
 
 
4.7 
 
 
4.9 
 
 
4.6 
 
Asset ranks 
(%) (5) 
 
 
High:12 
Med:71 
Low: 17 
 
High:13  
Med:70 
Low: 17 
 
High:32 
Med:76 
Low:  2 
 
High:  5 
Med:67 
Low: 28  
 
High: 6  
Med:74 
Low: 20 
 
High: 0 
Med:90 
Low:10 
 
High: 55 
Med: 38 
Low:  7 
 
High:20 
Med:75 
Low:  5 
 
Employed off 
farm semi-
permanently 
(%) (6) 
 
 
28.2 
 
 
15.1 
 
 
16.8 
 
 
17.9 
 
 
19.6 
 
 
21.3 
 
 
19.8 
 
 
21.7 
 
Occasionally 
employed on 
other farms 
(%) (7) 
 
Karen: 
58 
Other: 
46 
 
Karen: 
100 
Other: 
0 
 
Karen: 
80 
Other: 
20 
 
Karen: 
60 
Other: 
47 
 
Karen: 
40 
Other: 
60 
 
Karen: 
100 
Other: 
0 
 
Karen: 
100 
Other:  
0 
 
Karen: 
80 
Other: 
20 
(1) An index calculated by dividing the total kilograms of rice produced on rai by the total kilograms of 
rice produced on na (100% indicates no rai, 0% indicates no na). 
(2) This indicates the proportion of food versus traded crops cultivated in each vil lage. 
(3) This is an indicator of crop specialization. 
(4) This is the total of all  household members, including those away. 
(5) Cumulative index of household wealth, averaged for each village, based on number and quality of 
key assets concerning house, transport, and consumer goods. 
(6) This is the proportion of village populations reported to be employed semi-permanently in non-
agricultural activities outside villages. 
(7) Most respondents worked occasionally on other Karen farms or Hmong or Thai farms.  
 
